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ESSAY
CHEVRON AS CONSTRUCTION
Lawrence B. Solum† & Cass R. Sunstein††

In 1984, the Supreme Court declared that courts should
uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, so long as those interpretations are reasonable. The
Chevron framework, as it is called, is now under serious pressure. Current debates can be both illuminated and softened
with reference to an old distinction between interpretation on
the one hand and construction on the other. In cases of interpretation, judges (or agencies) must ascertain the meaning of
a statutory term. In cases of construction, judges (or agencies)
must develop implementing principles or specify a statutory
term. Chevron as construction is supported by powerful arguments; it is consistent with the underlying sources of law, and
agencies have relevant comparative advantages in developing
implementing principles. Chevron as interpretation is more
controversial. Those who reject Chevron in the context of interpretation should nonetheless accept it in the context of construction. The distinction between interpretation and
construction explains some important cases in the 1940s and
also in the post-Chevron era.
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I
TWO CHEVRONS
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. has a strong claim to being the most important case in all
of administrative law. It offers a familiar two-step framework
for organizing judicial review of agency interpretations of law.
1

†
††
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1
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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In the Court’s own words, “[f]irst, always, is the question
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question
at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”2 If the intent of Congress is not clear, courts must proceed to Step Two.
Again in the Court’s words, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”3 With Step Two, courts ask whether
the agency’s interpretation is “permissible” or reasonable, not
whether it is correct.
On a standard view, this framework reflects a unitary
“Chevron Doctrine.”4 It applies to a single activity, called “interpretation,” and it grows out of a single problem, called “ambiguity.” In the face of ambiguity, courts show “deference” to
agency action. This simple framework captures much of the
conventional wisdom about Chevron. If the framework is understood in this light, the current controversy over Chevron is
understandable. Contrary to Marbury v. Madison,5 it seems to
say that it is emphatically the province of the administrative
department to say what the law is.6
2

Id. at 842–43.
Id. at 843.
4
The literature is vast. For a highly selective sampling, see generally
Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1392 (2017); Jack M. Beermann, End the Failed Chevron Experiment Now:
How Chevron Has Failed and Why It Can and Should Be Overruled, 42 CONN. L.
REV. 779 (2010); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron’s Mistake, 58 DUKE L.J. 549
(2009); Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes: An
Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255 (1988); Jacob E. Gersen &
Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J. 676 (2007); Lisa
Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933 (2017); Michael
Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (2015);
Douglas W. Kmiec, Judicial Deference to Executive Agencies and the Decline of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269 (1988); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill,
Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351 (1994);
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301 (1988); Matthew C.
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597
(2009); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron
Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012); Note, “How Clear
is Clear” in Chevron’s Step One?, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1687 (2005).
5
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
6
See generally Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187
(2016) (outlining the tension between Chevron deference and the constitutional
function of an independent judiciary). We are bracketing the questions raised by
so-called “Auer deference,” based on Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997),
which calls for judicial deference to agency interpretations of regulations (as op3
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With this concern in mind, Justice Neil Gorsuch objects
that Chevron “[t]ransfer[s] the job of saying what the law is from
the judiciary to the executive.”7 Justice Brett Kavanaugh describes Chevron as “an atextual invention by courts” and as
“nothing more than a judicially orchestrated shift of power
from Congress to the Executive Branch.”8 Justice Clarence
Thomas argues that Chevron is inconsistent with the Constitution.9 In his view, the decision “wrests from Courts the ultimate interpretative authority to ‘say what the law is,’” and
instead “hands it over to the Executive.”10 Justice Anthony
Kennedy captured a widespread view in his parting shot at
Chevron.11 He wrote that “reflexive deference” to agency interpretations “is troubling,” and that “when deference is applied to
other questions of statutory interpretation, such as an agency’s
interpretation of the statutory provisions that concern the
scope of its own authority, it is more troubling still.”12 He
concluded that “it seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider, in an appropriate case, the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”13 He
suggested that the proper rules “should accord with constitutional separation-of-powers principles and the function and
province of the Judiciary.”14
These various suggestions make it clear that the Chevron
doctrine may be ripe for reconsideration. But what if there are
actually two quite distinct Chevron doctrines? In one sense,
this is an odd suggestion, asking us to think about Chevron in
a new way. But as we shall show, the idea that there are two
Chevron doctrines helps makes sense of much of what courts
have actually been doing with the doctrine, of where the docposed to statutes). The status of Auer deference was recently considered by the
Supreme Court, which narrowly reaffirmed that form of deference (while also
qualifying it). See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2408 (2019). In our view, the
distinction between construction and interpretation may be relevant in that context as well, but it raises separate considerations. For a recent discussion of “Auer
deference,” see generally Kristin E. Hickman & Mark R. Thomson, The
Chevronization of Auer, 103 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 103 (2019).
7
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
8
Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV.
2118, 2150 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
9
Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2712 (2015) (Thomas, J. concurring)
(quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177).
10
Id.
11
Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2120–21 (2018) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
12
Id. at 2120.
13
Id. at 2121.
14
Id.
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trine is most secure, and of where the current controversy is
most understandable.
Our analysis turns on an old distinction in American legal
theory between “interpretation,” which calls for discerning the
meaning15 of a statute, and “construction,” which calls for determining the legal effect of the statute, through implementation rules, specification, and other devices.16 The modern
version of the distinction traces its origins to the work of the
great contracts treatise writer, Arthur Corbin,17 and was reintroduced to contemporary legal theory starting in the 1990s by

15
The word “meaning” is itself ambiguous. See C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS,
THE MEANING OF MEANING: A STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF LANGUAGE UPON THOUGHT AND
OF THE SCIENCE OF SYMBOLISM 186–87 (8th ed. 1946) (exploring different senses of
“meaning”); Michael L. Geis, On Meaning: The Meaning of Meaning in the Law, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1125, 1125–26 (1995) (observing that the Supreme Court uses the
words “means” and “meaning” in multiple ways); A.P. Martinich, Four Senses of
‘Meaning’ in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical Interpretation, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225, 226 (2009) (“Equivocating on the word ‘meaning’ is easy
both because that word has several related senses and because understanding
the meaning of a text in one of these senses is crucial to understanding its
meaning in another sense.”). To be precise, we use the word “meaning” to refer to
“communicative content,” roughly the linguistic meaning of the statute in context.
The communicative content of a statutory text can be understood as the set of
propositions and concepts that are communicated by the statute to the intended
readers of the text. See Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal
Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 479, 484–507 (2013).
16
The interpretation-construction distinction goes back at least as far as
Francis Lieber in 1939. FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 43–44,
111 n.2 (Roy M. Mersky & J. Myron Jacobstein eds., 1970). Unlike the modern
version of the distinction, Lieber’s version of the distinction does not explicitly
differentiate communicative content and legal content. See Gregory Klass, Contracts, Constitutions, and Getting the Interpretation-Construction Distinction Right,
18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming 2020); Greg Klass, Interpretation and
Construction 1: Francis Lieber, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://
blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19/interpretation-and-construction-1francis-lieber-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/K52V-B3YJ]; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 2: Samuel Williston, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 23, 2015), https://
blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/23/interpretation-and-construction-2-samuel-williston-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/3224-W4CD]; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: Arthur Linton Corbin, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 25, 2015),
http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/25/interpretation-and-construction-3-arthur-linton-corbin-greg-klass/ [https://perma.cc/8ELH-PJHK]; see also
Ralf Poscher, The Hermeneutic Character of Legal Construction, in LAW’S HERMENEUTICS: OTHER INVESTIGATIONS 207 (Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard eds., 2017).
17
3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON
THE RULES OF CONTRACT LAW §§ 532–35 (1960 & Supp.1980); see also 4 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 600–02 (3d ed. 1961).
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Keith Whittington18 and others.19 Today, most courts and
scholars use the two words interchangeably, sometimes referring to “interpretation” in the older sense, sometimes to “construction,” and sometimes to both.20 We shall argue that an
understanding of this old distinction casts a new light on the
debate over judicial review of agency interpretations of law.
In Chevron itself, the question involved the meaning of a
single word in the Clean Air Act: “source.”21 That word was
undefined in the relevant section of the Act. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) argued that a source could include
an entire plant.22 The Natural Resources Defense Council argued that a plantwide definition was unlawful and that every
pollution-emitting device within a plant counted as a source,
and not the plant itself.23 But no one seriously disputed the
linguistic meaning of the word “source”: expressed in the vocabulary of the interpretation-construction distinction, there
was agreement on the correct interpretation of the statutory
language.24 The real question was not about the linguistic
meaning of the term; it was about how to implement that
meaning in the relevant context. In that sense, Chevron in18
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 4–15 (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 5–14 (1999), and
subsequently in the work of Randy Barnett. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism
for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 613–14 & n.9, 644–45 (1999).
19
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 89–130 (2004, rev. ed. 2014) (discussing the interpretation-construction
distinction); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 65, 65–66 (2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Interpretation]. One of us (Solum) has written on the distinction. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010) [hereinafter
Solum, Interpretation-Construction]; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) [hereinafter Solum,
Originalism].
20
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
is itself a case in point. Examples are legion. See, e.g., Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 218–23 (2009); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–703 (1995). Justice Antonin Scalia and
Bryan Garner took the position that “interpretation” and “construction” are synonymous. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 15–17 (2012). For a reply, see Solum, supra note 15, at 483–88.
Nothing important hangs on the use of the words “interpretation” and “construction” to describe the conceptual difference between the discovery of the meaning
(or communicative content) of a statute and the determination of the legal effect
(including implementing rules) given to the statutory text. We use those words
because they reflect longstanding usage.
21
42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(5) (2018).
22
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837, 857.
23
Id. at 859.
24
Id. at 860–61.

R
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volved a question of statutory construction. The Court’s holding
was that given that two different implementing rules were consistent with the meaning of the statutory text, it should defer to
the choice made by the agency.
Many cases follow this basic pattern. Consider, for example, the question whether a statutory term “harm,” in the Endangered Species Act, includes “significant habitat
modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures
wildlife.”25 Landowners and others argued that “harm” was
limited to hunting or killing members of endangered species,
and that it could not include habitat modification that incidentally or unintentionally harmed them.26 There is a good argument that in context, the word “harm” was sufficiently opentextured as to permit either a broad or a narrow construction.
Both ways of implementing the statute are consistent with the
meaning of “harm.” Let us call such cases “Chevron as
Construction.”
Chevron as Construction insists on judicial deference to
agency action in what is sometimes called the “construction
zone”—the space created when a statute is vague or opentextured. When such spaces exist, someone must fill them
through an implementation rule, which is more specific or precise than the statute itself.27 Chevron as Construction does not
involve deference to an agency’s view of the linguistic meaning
of the statute, and it does not authorize judicial deference to an
agency construction that is inconsistent with that meaning.
Thus understood, Chevron as Construction is consistent
with relevant sources of law,28 and it is supported by powerful
25

Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 690.
Id. at 693.
27
The phrase “construction zone” expresses the idea that a statute with
vague, open-textured, or irreducibly ambiguous language creates underdeterminacy with respect to a set of issues and cases. In the zone of underdeterminacy, statutory construction is required. By contrast, the phrase
“interpretation zone” is sometimes used to refer to the set of issues and cases
where the outcome is determined by the clear meaning of the statutory text. See
Samuel P. Jordan & Christopher K. Bader, State Power to Define Jurisdiction, 47
GA. L. REV. 1161, 1213 (2013) (using the phrase “interpretation zone” to refer to
the set of issues and cases in which adherence to the meaning of a legal text
would determine legal effect); Solum, Interpretation-Construction, supra note 19,
at 108 (introducing “construction zone” to designate issues and cases in which
the meaning of a legal text underdetermines legal effect).
28
On those sources, above all the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 551–559 (2018). See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613
(2019). In Part IV, we turn to the question whether Congress has authorized
courts to defer to agency decisions in the circumstances of Chevron as Construction. On the primacy of congressional instructions, see Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 516–17.
26

R
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and familiar pragmatic arguments. The agency may have an
advantage over courts in terms of technical expertise. The
agency is better equipped to choose between alternative implementing rules on policy grounds. As the Chevron Court itself
put it:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some
cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the
basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast,
an agency to which Congress has delegated policymaking
responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation,
properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of
wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and
it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of
everyday realities.29

Nor is Chevron as Construction problematic on separation
of powers grounds. When agencies engage in statutory construction, they are not impinging on the judicial responsibility
to interpret any statute. The courts can interpret the statute
and determine whether the agency’s implementation rule is
consistent with the statutory text. Indeed, Chevron as Construction requires them to do exactly that. Under Chevron itself, courts must decide, on their own, whether the statute is
ambiguous; they may not defer to the agency’s view on that
question. Moreover, the court defers to the agency’s choice
only so long as it is reasonable. In our view, Chevron as Construction stands on firm ground.30 And indeed, many decisions that defer to agency “interpretations” of law, both before
and after Chevron, are best understood as Chevron as
Construction.31
From its inception, however, Chevron could also be understood to support what we will call “Chevron as Interpretation.”
29
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865–66 (1984).
30
Again we assume that there is congressional authorization, infra Part IV.
31
See, e.g., Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44,
45 (2011) (finding that the Treasury Department reasonably construed “full-time
employee” in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10)); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S.
208, 217–19, 218 n.4 (2009) (finding that the EPA reasonably construed national
performance standards under the Clean Water Act); see also supra text accompanying note 28.
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Recall that “interpretation” is the activity that discovers the
meaning (the linguistic meaning in context) of the statutory
text. Under Chevron as Interpretation, deference to agency interpretations of law is required even when interpretation is
involved. The trigger is ambiguity. Given that for many lawyers
and judges, the standard vocabulary uses the word “interpretation” to encompass both the discovery of meaning and the creation of implementation rules (“interpretation” and
“construction” in the older sense of these terms), it was natural
for courts to apply Chevron to cases that involved questions
about the meaning of the statute—and they did.32
In short: Chevron as Construction is limited to statutory
“construction zones.” Chevron as Construction allows agencies
to operate in the construction zone, so long as they are doing so
reasonably. Chevron as Interpretation applies Chevron to cases
that required the resolution of a dispute about the meaning of
statutory language: these cases are in the “interpretation
zone,” where the meaning of the statute will determine the
outcome. Chevron as Interpretation allows agencies to resolve
ambiguities with respect to interpretation, and that is controversial. Even so, there are plausible reasons for courts to pay
substantial attention to an agency’s reading of a statute in
Chevron as Interpretation cases and perhaps to defer to that
reading.33 But these reasons are different in kind from those
that apply in Chevron as Construction cases. Textualists who
reject the justifications for deference to agency interpretations
can accept the quite different rationale for deference to agency
constructions.
II
AMBIGUITIES
The word “ambiguity” has several different senses (or semantic meanings).34 One sense of “ambiguity” applies whenever a statute is unclear for any reason, including vagueness or
“open texture.” When a statute is vague, there are borderline
32
See, e.g., Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974 (1986) (finding that
the FDA reasonably interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 346 even in light of the statute’s
ambiguity); see also infra pp. 109–11.
33
For some of those reasons, see Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368–71 (1986); Scalia, supra note
28, at 514–18.
34
For relevant discussion, see generally Ward Farnsworth et al., Ambiguity
About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
257, 260–91 (2010) (empirically examining the distinctions between how judges
and ordinary English readers define “ambiguity” and interpret ambiguous texts).

R
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cases.35 Open texture, a term made famous by H.L.A. Hart
in The Concept of Law,36 is more complex.37 Open-textured
language involves concepts that are not precise, leaving cases
that might or might not be covered by the concept.38
But there is another sense of ambiguity, a more technical
sense, that limits ambiguity to cases in which a statutory provision has more than one possible linguistic meaning.39 In law
as in life, most ambiguity is resolved by context. There may be
two possible readings given the literal meaning of the words,
but once we examine the context, only one of these readings
may be correct. “Bank” can refer to financial institutions or the
ground that abuts a river, but in a statute, it will almost always
be clear which of the two senses of the word was intended.
“Bat” can be an animal or an implement used by hitters in
baseball, but in a statute, there will almost never be confusion
about the meaning of that word. Semantic ambiguity is ubiquitous, but it is generally resolved by context.
Because Chevron used the word “ambiguity,” it reinforced
the natural tendency to read its framework as applicable to
both interpretation and construction—to both the discovery of
35
For discussion of the philosophical idea of “vagueness,” see Roy Sorensen,
Vagueness, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA. PHIL. ARCHIVE (Feb. 8, 1997), https://
plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/vagueness/ [https://perma.cc/
96QH-62NP]; see infra Part II, pp. 109–10.
36
See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127–28 (2d ed. 1994) (“Whichever
device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication of standards of
behaviour, these, however smoothly they work over the great mass of ordinary
cases, will, at some point where their application is in question, prove indeterminate; they will have what has been termed an open texture.”).
37
The phrase “open texture” was devised by Friedrich Waismann to express
the idea that family-resemblance concepts are underdeterminate. Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in LOGIC AND LANGUAGE, 117–144 (Antony Flew ed., 1951). The
idea of family resemblance itself derives from Ludwig Wittgenstein. LUDWIG
WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 67–77, 108 (P.M.S. Hacker & Joachim Schulte eds., G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., rev. 4th ed. 2009).
38
The phrase “open textured” has been used in different ways by different
legal theorists. We are using the phrase “open texture” in a stipulated sense that
includes (but is not necessarily limited to) the following: (1) terms that express
family resemblance concepts; (2) terms that express multi-criterial concepts
where the criteria are incommensurable; and (3) terms that express concepts that
involve multi-dimensional vagueness. Whatever the ultimate nature of “open texture,” we will assume that an open-textured provision has a core of settled meaning and penumbral cases. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958) (“There must be a core of settled
meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words
are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out.”). On the idea of multicriterial concepts with incommensurable dimensions, see Hrafn Asgeirsson, On
the Instrumental Value of Vagueness in the Law, 125 ETHICS 425, 429–31 (2015).
39
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in
Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 11 (2015).
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meaning and the creation of implementation rules or the effort
to specify a vague or open-textured language. And in some
cases, Chevron has been applied to interpretation (again, the
discovery of meaning). For a clear example, consider Young v.
Community Nutrition Institute.40 The statute at issue there
stated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services “shall
promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon
to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public
health.”41 The question was whether the provision required the
Secretary to set a tolerance level for aflatoxin, a carcinogen, as
it would if the phrase “as he finds necessary” modified the
phrase “to such extent,” or instead gave the Secretary the discretion not to act at all, as it would if the phrase “as he finds
necessary” modified the phrase “shall promulgate regulations.”
Thus, Young v. Community Nutrition Institute involved what is
called “syntactic ambiguity”: the resolution of the ambiguity
required interpretation (what did the provision mean?) and not
construction (how should it be implemented?).
Justice John Paul Stevens, author of Chevron, thought
that the case was exceptionally easy. As he put it, the “antecedent of the qualifying language is quite clearly the phrase ‘limiting the quantity therein or thereon,’ which immediately
precedes it, rather than the word ‘shall,’ which appears eight
words before it.”42 As he saw it, the alternative interpretation,
“by skipping over the words ‘limiting the quantity therein or
thereon,’ renders them superfluous and of no operative force or
effect.”43 Justice Stevens believed that the statute’s meaning
was clear (under Chevron Step One) and therefore that deference was not required.44 (In our terms, he might have been
read to say that Young was a case of interpretation, not
construction.)
But the Court in Young disagreed. In its words: “As enemies of the dangling participle well know, the English language
does not always force a writer to specify which of two possible
objects is the one to which a modifying phrase relates.”45 In the
Court’s view, the dense sentence could be read either way; “to
such extent as he finds necessary” could well qualify “shall
promulgate regulations.”46 In the face of an ambiguous statu40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 974, 986–87, 987 n.3 (1986).
21 U.S.C. § 346 (2018).
Young, 476 U.S. at 985 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 986.
Id. at 986–88.
Id. at 980–81 (majority opinion).
Id.
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tory provision, the agency would prevail under Chevron. There
are many cases in this vein.47 A statutory term is ambiguous;
reasonable people can read it differently. The agency prevails
for that reason.
This is Chevron as Interpretation: deference to an agency in
a case in which the question concerns the meaning of statutory
language. Young v. Community Nutrition Institute moved beyond Chevron as Construction by deferring to an agency’s interpretation of language that was ambiguous in the narrow
sense of “ambiguity” that is distinct from open texture or
vagueness. Such deference is different in kind from what occurred in Chevron itself—that is, deference to the agency’s decision about how to implement a statute within the construction
zone created by vague or open-textured language.
Justice Stevens’ essential argument does not provide all of
the picture, but it helps account for the distinction between
many cases in which agencies prevail and many cases in which
they do not. Much of the time, agencies are essentially specifying vague statutory terms. When they are operating in the
construction zone, their choices are generally upheld, and
courts are notably deferential. Courts find no Step One violation, and under Step Two, agency choices are usually deemed
reasonable.48 But in other cases, the real question is how to
handle an ambiguity. These cases, typically resolved under
Step One, often produce losses, and courts are notably less
deferential.49 In a nutshell: Step One losses, for agencies, typically involve interpretation rather than construction. As a prominent example, consider Massachusetts v. EPA,50 which raised
the question whether the EPA could define the statutory term
47
See, e.g., Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266, 1270–71 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (upholding the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of the
term “feasible” under the Safe Drinking Water Act); Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 219–20 (2009) (upholding the Environmental Protection
Agency’s interpretation of the phrase “best technology available” under the Clean
Water Act).
48
See, e.g., Entergy Corp., 556 U.S. at 217–18 (upholding the Environmental
Protection Agency’s interpretation of the term “best technology available” to include a cost-benefit analysis as reasonable); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697–98 (1995) (upholding the Secretary of
the Interior’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act’s term “harm” to include habitat destruction as reasonable). Agencies do of course lose, even if they
are in the construction zone, if their interpretations are deemed unreasonable.
An illuminating example is Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).
49
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218,
225–26 (1994) (holding that the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of the term “modify” was not owed deference because the term in its statutory context was not ambiguous).
50
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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“air pollutant” so as not to include greenhouse gases. The
Court ruled that it could not because the term had a single
meaning, taken in its context.51
Consider in this light the dispute about the level of ambiguity that is sufficient to trigger Chevron deference. Should a
court defer to an agency if it thinks that the agency is forty-five
percent likely to be right? Thirty percent? Twenty percent?52
When an ambiguity is involved, it seems extreme to say that the
agency will prevail even if the court has a very firm conviction
that it is wrong. Actual practice53 fits with the view that courts
ought not to accept agency interpretations of ambiguities
merely because there is some question about meaning.54
On any view, Chevron as Construction should be unproblematic, but Chevron as Interpretation can be questioned.55 From the standpoint of “textualism” (the theory of
statutory interpretation that holds that courts should be
bound by the plain meaning of the statutory text, taken in
context), the interpretive version of Chevron seems problematic.56 Why should agencies be allowed to sort out ambiguities? Why should courts defer to agency interpretations?
Young did not seem to present a question about policy or about
implementing rules; it presented a question about meaning. At
the very least, the question whether courts should defer to
agency interpretations raises distinctive considerations. In
short, there are two Chevron doctrines, and they rest on quite
different premises: the two Chevrons do not stand or fall
together.
In an instructive discussion, Justice Kavanaugh implicitly
distinguishes between construction and interpretation.57 Indeed, he seems to argue for recasting Chevron in terms that
closely correspond to those urged here. Justice Kavanaugh
contends that when Congress has used some vague or open51

Id. at 500.
See Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 2150–51.
53
See, e.g., Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 303 (2014) (“Agencies empowered to resolve statutory ambiguities must operate within the bounds
of reasonable interpretation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 512 U.S. at 226–27 (holding that an agency’s interpretation of
the term “modify” was not owed deference solely because one dictionary gave the
word a more expansive definition than is generally accepted).
54
See Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 2150–51.
55
See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 499 (1989); Abner J. Mikva, How
Should the Courts Treat Administrative Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7–9 (1986).
56
We are bracketing the question whether Congress has directed courts to
defer to agency interpretations. See discussion infra Part IV.
57
Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 2121–22.
52

R

R
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textured term, like “reasonable” or “feasible,” it makes sense for
judges to defer to agency interpretations.58 He is far more
skeptical of the idea of deference in cases in which Congress
has used some specific term.59 In essence, Justice Kavanaugh
can be seen to be making a distinction between construction
and interpretation, and arguing that Chevron should be applied
to the former and not to the latter.60
We do not mean to say that insofar as he rejects Chevron as
applied to specific terms, Justice Kavanaugh’s conclusion is
necessarily correct. Those who reject his conclusion might
urge that even in the face of ambiguity—when interpretation of
specific terms is involved—it is appropriate to allow agencies,
with their expertise and accountability, to make the choice.61
On one view, resolution of genuine ambiguities calls for some
kind of policy choice, or even if it does not, the resolution is
best made by those with political accountability and technical
expertise.62 In some cases, textualism might turn out to produce uncertainty: even if context suggests that one meaning is
more likely than another, reasonable doubts may remain. And
perhaps agencies should be allowed to sort out uncertainty if
there is room for reasonable disagreement. In any case, textualism is not the only theory of statutory interpretation; other
views emphasize the objective purpose or function of statutes.
Our goal here is not to evaluate Justice Kavanaugh’s criticism of Chevron as it is now understood, but to say that his
central argument can be accepted while also approving of
Chevron deference both on the facts of Chevron itself and, more
generally, in the large category of cases that involve Chevron as
Construction. To sharpen the point: it is one thing to say that
agencies should be allowed to adopt constructions that specify
or implement the meaning of terms like “source” and “harm,”
assuming these have not been defined in a way that resolves
the question of construction. It is another thing to say that
agencies should be allowed to decide what words are modified
by the phrase “to such extent as he finds necessary.” Textualists can embrace deference with respect to the agency crafting
58

Id. at 2153–54.
Id.
60
A similar point can be made about the controversial ruling in Auer v.
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), though we do not explore that point here.
61
See Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1626–29.
62
For a useful discussion of the nature of purposivism or functionalism as a
theory of statutory interpretation, see Michael Herz, Purposivism and Institutional
Competence in Statutory Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 89, 92–93. Herz
distinguishes “purposivism” from “intentionalism.” See id. at 93.
59

R
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of implementation rules, while rejecting deference to agency
interpretations that resolve semantic or syntactic ambiguities.
In other words, textualists can embrace Chevron as Construction, even if they reject Chevron as Interpretation.
III
AN OBJECTION
We are keenly aware of a possible objection to the distinction we are drawing between interpretation and construction,
at least for purposes of analyzing Chevron. Courts today only
rarely make the distinction in an explicit way,63 and until recently it has been largely lost in contemporary public law. As
Professor Michael Herz has observed, “[a]lmost without exception, writing about statutory interpretation uses ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction’ as synonyms.”64
In administrative law, reviving the distinction between interpretation and construction might not be so controversial if
the distinction were always easy to apply. But at least sometimes it is not. In practice, answers to the question whether an
agency or a court is involved in interpretation or instead construction may not have a clear answer, and lawyers and judges
63
Very recently, some courts have noted the distinction. See, e.g., Wayne
Land & Mineral Grp. LLC v. Del. River Basin Comm’n., 894 F.3d 509, 528 n.13 (3d
Cir. 2018) (“By ‘interpretation of language’ we determine what ideas that language
induces in other persons. By ‘construction of the contract,’ . . . we determine its
legal operation—its effect upon the action of courts and administrative officials.”);
Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 41 F. Supp. 3d 1188, 1275 n.86 (D.N.M. 2014)
(questioning “whether only the semantic meaning of ‘causes’ is fixed . . . based
upon the term’s original public meaning, or whether the legal doctrines of ‘causation’ are also fixed”); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance Co. v. Voeltz, 431 N.W.2d 783,
786 (1988) (“Because this case was tried to the court, the distinction between
interpretation and construction becomes important in relation to our scope of
review. When, as here, extrinsic evidence is offered for the interpretation of policy
words, the court’s interpretation if supported by substantial evidence is binding
on us.”); Wischmeier Farms, Inc. v. Wischmeier, 883 N.W.2d 538, *3 (Iowa Ct.
App. 2016) (unpublished table decision) (“Interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of the words in the contract, while construction is the process
of deciding their legal effect.”); Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v. Barrick Goldstrike
Mines, Inc., 345 P.3d 1040, 1041 (Nev. 2015) (arguing that the meanings of the
Constitution’s words remain constant, but their application may vary depending
on time and place). Other courts continue to resist the distinction. See Absher v.
AutoZone, Inc., 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 817, 821 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (“Although
there may be a theoretical distinction between ‘interpretation’ and ‘construction,’
we make no such distinction.” (citations omitted)).
64
Herz, supra note 4, at 1891–92; see also Evan J. Criddle, Response, The
Constitution of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 69 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 325, 341
(2016) (“[S]tatutory construction constitutes statutory meaning through an act of
juris-generative judgment that draws on normative considerations.”).
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could have reasonable disagreements about the proper characterization of an agency action.
In short, one might object to our use of the interpretationconstruction distinction on the ground that it is an unfamiliar
idea that is sometimes difficult to apply in practice. We begin
our reply to this objection by emphasizing that if the distinction
is not familiar, it once was,65 and it is more familiar now than it
was a decade or two ago.66 In the context of administrative law,
Professor Gillian Metzger has deployed the distinction in her
argument for “administrative constitutionalism” as a manifestation of constitutional construction.67 Both Professor Michael
Herz and Professor Evan Criddle have noted the possible significance of the interpretation-construction distinction for Chevron deference.68 Evan Bernick’s recent article, Envisioning
Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, discusses the significance of the interpretation-construction distinction for an
originalist understanding of the Administrative Procedure
Act.69 More broadly, the distinction between interpretation
and construction has come to be recognized in many contexts,

65

See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
See Amy Barrett, The Interpretation/Construction Distinction in Constitutional Law: Annual Meeting of the AALS Section on Constitutional Law, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 1, 1 (2010); Harold Anthony Lloyd, Speaker Meaning and the Interpretation and Construction of Executive Orders, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 319, 323
(2018); Victoria Nourse, Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from Originalism: The
Case of Executive Power, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2018); Brian Taylor Goldman,
Note, The Classical Avoidance Canon as a Principle of Good-Faith Construction, 43
J. LEGIS. 170, 172–75 (2017); supra text accompanying notes 8–9.
67
Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897,
1912–14 (2013).
68
See Criddle, supra note 64; Herz, supra note 4, at 1871. Professor Jeffrey
Pojanowski also notes the potential significance of the distinction for Chevron.
See Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV.
852, 887 n.185 (2020).
69
Evan D. Bernick, Envisioning Administrative Procedure Act Originalism, 70
ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 835 (2018).

R

66
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including constitutional law,70 contract law,71 criminal law,72
patent law,73 and the law of trusts and wills.74
But we acknowledge that on some theories of interpretation, the distinction is contestable. Take, for example, Ronald
Dworkin’s view, which sees interpretation as an effort to make
the best constructive sense out of the relevant legal materials
(including statutory text).75 To simplify a complex story, Dworkin’s approach requires judges (1) to respect the constraints of
“fit” (meaning fidelity to the existing materials) and (2) within
those constraints, to decide what best “justifies” the existing
materials, by making the best constructive sense of them. In
constitutional law, for example, the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as applied to (say) bans on same-sex marriage,
would turn on what ruling would make that Clause the best
that it can be. We could say the same thing about “source” and
“to such extent as he finds necessary.” If we embrace Dworkin’s view, Chevron would, on plausible assumptions, rest on
new and firmer grounds. Aren’t agencies in a better position
than courts to make the best constructive sense out of statutory provisions? But on other also plausible assumptions,
Dworkin’s view casts Chevron in a much worse light. Shouldn’t
independent courts attempt that task?
But put the questions of comparative competence, and of
trust and distrust, to one side. It should be clear that on Dworkin’s view, the distinction between interpretation and construction is blurred: this blurring is reflected in Dworkin’s label
70
Barnett, Interpretation, supra note 19; Solum, Originalism, supra note 19,
at 453;.
71
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Hermeneutics and Contract Default Rules: An
Essay on Lieber and Corbin, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 2225, 2225-26 (1995); E. Allan
Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940 (1967).
72
Paul R. Piaskoski, The Federal Bank Robbery Act: Why the Current Split
Involving the Use of Force Requirement for Attempted Bank Robbery Is Really an
Exception, 109 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 675, 685 (2019).
73
Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 536 (2013). See also Camilla Hrdy &
Ben V. Picozzi, Claim Construction or Statutory Construction?: A Response to Chiang & Solum, 124 YALE L.J. F. 208, 208–11 (2014).
74
Richard F. Storrow, Judicial Discretion and the Disappearing Distinction
Between Will Interpretation and Construction, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 65–66
(2005); Jarell A. Dillman, Note, Where There’s a Will There’s a Way: An Examination of In Re Estate of Kesling and the South Dakota Supreme Court’s Application of
the Plain Meaning Rule, 60 S.D. L. REV. 121, 133 (2015).
75
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 52–53 (1986). For discussion of the complex
and uncertain relationship between Dworkin’s views and the interpretation-construction distinction, see Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U.
L. REV. 551, 568–69 (2010).
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for his theory, “constructive interpretation.”76 For Dworkin,
interpretation has a constructive dimension, and necessarily
so.77 For those who embrace purposive approaches to interpretation, or follow the Legal Process approach, the same might

76
Ronald Dworkin, Bork’s Jurisprudence, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 676 (1990)
(reviewing ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990)).
77
Because Dworkin does not explicitly address the interpretation-construction distinction, his position has to be teased out from his development of the
theory of constructive interpretation. Some version of the conceptual content of
the interpretation-construction distinction might be implicit in Dworkin’s notion
of “semantic availability,” introduced in the following passage:
[Lawyers] must decide, for example, what division of political authority among different branches of government and civil society is
best, all things considered. That question in turn forces upon
American lawyers, at least, further and more general questions of
democratic theory; they must assume or decide, for instance, drawing on theory or instinct, how far unelected judges should assume
an authority to decide for themselves which of the semantically
available interpretations of a controversial statute would produce
the best law.
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 133 (2011). As one of the present authors (Solum) has argued, the notion of semantic availability, when combined
with the idea that “constructive interpretations” must fit and justify the legal
materials, seems to imply something that is very much like the conceptual content of the interpretation-construction distinction. Dworkin’s implicit reliance on
the distinction is especially clear when he relies on a two-step model of constructive interpretation:
We can now see that the first step involves interpretation; after
Hercules identifies the set of authoritative legal texts, he then ascertains their linguistic meaning or semantic content. The linguistic
meaning of the texts in turn determines what Dworkin calls “semantic availability.” The second step involves construction—determination of the content of legal doctrine from among the range of
possibilities that are semantically available. In easy cases, the
range of semantically available alternatives is narrow. Once we
have discovered the linguistic meaning of the relevant legal texts,
the relevant content of legal doctrine is clear, and construction (the
translation of semantic content into legal content) is easy. In hard
cases, the range of semantically available alternatives underdetermines the set of possible legal doctrines, and determination
of the legal effect of the text requires construction that goes beyond
easy translation of semantic content into legal content. This additional work at the stage of construction is what makes these cases
“hard.” Hard cases are located in what I call “the construction
zone.”
Solum, supra note 75, at 569 (footnotes omitted). We take no position on the
question whether Dworkin himself is implicitly committed to the conceptual content of the interpretation-construction distinction, but we observe that his resort
to semantic availability illustrates the powerful pull of the idea that discerning the
linguistic meaning of legal contexts can be distinguished from determining their
legal effect. The conceptual content of the interpretation-construction distinction
is independent of the use of the words “interpretation” and “construction” to mark
the difference between meaning and legal effect.
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also be true.78 The distinction between interpretation and construction is intelligible only on certain assumptions about the
nature of interpretation. In other words, the interpretationconstruction distinction is contestable; the merits of the distinction are linked to deep and persistent theoretical debates
about the nature of legal interpretation in general and statutory interpretation in particular.
Nonetheless, we insist that the distinction should not be
elusive or even obscure to lawyers and judges. Without a clear
statutory definition of “source,” a plantwide approach does not
depart from the standard meaning of that term. Without a
clear statutory definition of “harm,” significant habitat modification, actually killing or injuring wildlife, may or may not
count as such. But whether we side with the majority or the
dissent in Young, there was no construction zone. As we have
seen, the only question was whether the placement of “to such
extent as he finds necessary” produced ambiguity. Some of the
prominent Supreme Court decisions that apply Chevron deference plainly involved construction,79 and some of the most
prominent decisions that refuse to defer to agency views plainly
involved interpretation.80 It is not so hard to say which is
which. Our confidence in the ability of judges and lawyers to
understand and apply the interpretation-construction distinction is bolstered by the prominent role that it played in legal
theory and practice during the first half of the twentieth
century.
In other words, we believe that the interpretation-construction distinction is intelligible, even if it is also contestable. Critics of Chevron who insist that “interpretation” is the proper
function of judges and embrace a textualist approach may
nonetheless embrace Chevron as Construction. Deference to
agencies in the construction zone is entirely consistent with the
preservation of judicial authority over statutory interpretation.
Purposivists and others like Dworkin who may reject the inter-

78
See John F. Manning, Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 457, 458–59 (2014).
79
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009); Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 US 687, 687–88 (1995). To be
sure, it would be possible to argue, in these cases, that the agency’s decision was
an erroneous interpretation. In some cases, the real debate, within the Court, is
whether what is involved is a reasonable construction or instead an erroneous
interpretation.
80
See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 218–19
(1994).
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pretation-construction distinction may support further extensions of the Chevron doctrine for other reasons.
In these circumstances, we suggest that there may be common ground on Chevron as Construction. Judges might be
able to reach an incompletely theorized agreement81 that deference is appropriate in cases in which an agency acts to clarify
vague or open-textured language—despite disagreement at the
more fundamental theoretical level about what theory of statutory interpretation is true or best. Recall that the distinction
between Chevron as Interpretation and Chevron as Construction helps to explain a number of the decided cases. To be
sure, it is more usual to say that when agencies lose, it is
because statutory terms are unambiguous at Step One. In at
least some such cases, however, there is at least some kind of
ambiguity—but the Court insists on resolving it.82
Because of the fundamental distinction between Chevron
as Interpretation and Chevron as Construction, there is good
reason for the Supreme Court to adopt a cautious approach if it
should decide to reexamine the Chevron doctrine. If the Court
were to undertake such a reexamination in a Chevron-as-Interpretation case, it should be careful to distinguish that context
from the superficially similar Chevron-as-Construction category. In this area, the Court would be wise to adopt a minimalist approach, proceeding one step at a time and avoiding a
sweeping approach that conflates interpretation and construction.83 Whatever the Court ultimately decides about the viability of Chevron as Interpretation, it is clear that the viability of
this aspect of Chevron turns on concerns that are substantially
different from those that apply to the less controversial Chevron
as Construction line of cases.
IV
THE QUESTION OF LEGAL AUTHORITY
Thus far, we have argued that Chevron as Construction is
easy to justify and that the argument on behalf of Chevron as
Interpretation is both more challenging and different. These
81
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV.
1733, 1735–36 (1995).
82
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 498–99 (2007); MCI Telecomms.
Corp., 512 U.S. at 218–19.
83
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON
THE SUPREME COURT (2001); see also Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a Court,
and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951
(2005) (arguing that Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism may not be descriptively accurate or normatively convincing).
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arguments operate at the level of principle. But we have
delayed answering a question that is both natural and essential to ask: what source of law justifies judicial deference to
agency interpretations of law, and does it allow for a distinction
between interpretation and construction?
Section 706 of the APA says that courts “shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action.”84 It also says that courts shall
“hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . not in accordance with law”85 or “in
excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or
short of statutory right.”86 These provisions might be read to
make a simple declaration: decisions about the meaning of
statutes are for courts, not agencies, and the interpretationconstruction distinction is beside the point.87
This is not a wholly implausible reading of the text of section 706.88 Professor Thomas Merrill writes that the text “suggests that Congress contemplated courts would always apply
independent judgment on questions of law.”89 Professor John
Duffy agrees and adds, “[t]he legislative history of the APA
leaves no doubt that Congress thought the meaning of this
84

5 U.S.C. § 706 (2018).
Id. § 706(2)(A).
86
Id. § 706(2)(C).
87
Even from a purely textualist perspective, there is a case to be made that
Section 706 is consistent with Chevron as Construction. The injunctions to “interpret constitutional and statutory provisions” and decide “all relevant questions
of law” is ambiguous for at least two reasons. 5 U.S.C. § 706. First, the word
“interpretation,” when used without reference to the interpretation-construction
distinction, is ambiguous, sometimes referring to the combined activity of interpretation and construction but sometimes to construction or interpretation alone.
Second, the injunction to decide all relevant questions of law assumes but does
not specify some standard of relevance. In light of the legislative history, discussed briefly below, see supra text accompanying notes 84–92, and more fully by
Sunstein, supra note 28, at 1644–52, a case could be made that these ambiguities
should be resolved in favor of a reading that requires courts to determine the
linguistic meaning of the statutory text but allows for agency construction when
statutory language is vague, open-textured, or otherwise incomplete. Although
textualists eschew the use of legislative history as a source of purposes or intentions that determine statutory constructions independently, textualists can and
should embrace legislative history in the contextual disambiguation of language
that is vague or open textured. Even Justice Scalia embraced this role for legislative history. See Lawrence B. Solum, Federalist Society Panelist, Text Over Intent
and the Demise of Legislative History, 43 U. DAYTON L. REV. 103, 114 (2018).
88
See the important discussion in Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial
Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L.J. 908 (2017), which reaches this
conclusion without engaging the construction-interpretation distinction.
89
See Merrill, supra note 4, at 995.
85

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-5\CRN504.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 21

CHEVRON AS CONSTRUCTION

25-AUG-20

10:17

1485

provision plain.”90 Professor Jerry Mashaw sees things the
same way.91 But this reading is not inevitable. Read in its
context, the text section 706 is far from clear. The answer to
the “relevant question of law” may depend on what the agency
has said. With respect to judicial review of agency interpretations of law, Section 706 could easily be read as a restatement
of existing law, which allowed courts to defer to such interpretations; a great deal of contextual evidence in the 1940s supports exactly that reading.92
This is not the place for a full discussion, but we note that
the Senate Judiciary Committee print announces, “[a] restatement of the scope of review . . . is obviously necessary lest the
proposed statute be taken as limiting or unduly expanding
judicial review.”93 It adds that the goal of the section is “merely
to restate the several categories of questions of law subject to
judicial review.” The important 1945 letter of the Attorney
General, written to both houses of Congress shortly before enactment of the APA, had this to say about section 706: “This
declares the existing law concerning the scope of judicial
review.”94
And what was that existing law? In the key cases in which
the Court gave deference to agency judgments about law, the
construction zone was involved. In Gray v. Powell,95 decided in
1941, the Court was asked to review a determination by the
Director of the Bituminous Coal Division that a railroad company was not the “producer” of certain coal that it consumed.
The Court said that Congress had “delegate[d] th[e] function” of
interpreting the statutory term “to those whose experience in a
particular field gave promise of a better informed, more equitable” judgment, and that “this delegation will be respected and
the administrative conclusion left untouched.”96 These pragmatic observations were made in a case in which the agency
90
See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX.
L. REV. 113, 193 (1998).
91
See Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking Judicial Review of Administrative Action:
A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2243 (2011).
92
See Sunstein, supra note 2861, at 1664.
93
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH CONG., REPORT ON S. 7: A BILL TO
IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY PRESCRIBING FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 79TH
CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT OF 1944–46, at
11, 39 (1946) [hereinafter APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (emphasis added).
94
S. Rep. No. 79-752 (1945), as reprinted in APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 93, at 187, 230; see also APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 93, at 279, 414
(emphasis added).
95
Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411–12 (1941).
96
Id. at 412.
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was specifying the meaning of “producer,” an open-textured
term, and in which the linguistic meaning of that term would
support different constructions.
In NLRB v. Hearst Publications,97 decided in 1944, the
Court was asked to decide on the meaning of the word “employee” under the National Labor Relations Act, as applied to
“newsboys.” It said that the agency’s “[e]veryday experience in
the administration of the statute gives it familiarity” with the
underlying problem and concluded that the agency’s interpretation “is to be accepted if it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a
reasonable basis in law.”98 Here as well, the linguistic meaning
of the word “employee” did not either require or forbid the
agency’s view. As for the term “source,” so for the terms “employee” and “producers”: the agency was engaged in construction, and the Court deferred to its decisions. There are many
cases in this vein.
No large body of law is easily fit within a simple framework,
but we think that it is plausible to say that in cases in which
courts deferred to agency decisions in the pre-APA period, construction was frequently involved. We have noted that something similar can be said about the period since the APA was
enacted, emphatically including many decisions that apply the
Chevron framework.99 When agencies lose under Step One, it
is because they did not interpret the statute correctly.100 When
agencies win under Step One, it is often because they are in the
construction zone.101 It would be excessive to say that the
interpretation-construction distinction organizes all of the
cases, or explains what is “really” going on in them. But it is
not excessive to say that in many of the most important cases,
courts defer to agency constructions and reject agency
interpretations.
V
TERRA FIRMA
Our main suggestion is that Chevron is on firm ground
insofar as it requires courts to defer to agency constructions of
97

NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
Id. at 131.
99
See Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 566 U.S. 541, 558 (2012); Mayo Found.
for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 45 (2011); Household
Credit Servs. Inc. v. Pfennig, 541 U.S. 232, 238 (2004).
100
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528-29 (2007); MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 218–19 (1994).
101
Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208, 226 (2009); Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 687–88 (1995).
98
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law. On that understanding of Chevron, its framework is compatible with relevant sources of law, and agencies are in a
better position than courts to devise implementing rules and to
specify the meaning of open-textured terms. Reasonable people can and do disagree about whether Chevron is on firm
ground insofar as it requires courts to defer to agency interpretations of law. The case against Chevron as Interpretation rests
on the plausible view that interpretation—resolving questions
about the meaning of a statutory text—is the responsibility of
the courts.102 But that does not entail the quite distinct conclusion that agencies may not devise implementation rules for
vague, open-textured, or incomplete statutory language. Textualists can oppose Chevron as Interpretation and embrace
Chevron as Construction.
The distinction between Chevron as Interpretation and
Chevron as Construction accounts for widespread intuitions
and much (though not all) of actual practice. Whatever Chevron’s ultimate fate, we should be able to agree on one proposition: it makes sense to apply its framework to agency decisions
in the construction zone. In other words, Chevron itself, or
Chevron as Construction, should be uncontroversial.

102
One of us offers a general account of Chevron, with qualified approval of
Chevron as Interpretation, in Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1672–73.
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